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Introduction
The vast majority of products reach the hands of the consumers after going through the various stages of the so-called vertical production chain. Clearly, this implies that a …rm which operates in one stage of the vertical chain needs to trade with …rms that are active at previous and/or later production stages. According to a number of empirical studies (see e.g., Berto Villa-Boas, 2007; Bonnet and Dubois, 2010), a common way of trading among vertically related …rms, i.e., among input producers, …nal product manufacturers, and retailers, is through non-linear two-part tari¤ contracts. This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand competition in a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolist trades with two competing downstream …rms through two-part tari¤s.
A well-known result in oligopoly theory is that a one-tier market is more competitive and e¢ cient when it is characterized by Bertrand competition rather than by Cournot competition. In particular, Bertrand competition results into lower prices and pro…ts and higher output and consumer and total welfare than Cournot competition. Singh and Vives (1984) were the …rst to establish formally these results. A substantial body of the literature (see e.g., For instance, Cheng (1985) and Vives (1985) generalized these results respectively by means of a geographic approach and by considering the n-…rm oligopoly case with general demand functions. Dastidar (1997) and Häckner (2000) , instead, pointed out the sensitivity of the results in Singh and Vives to the sharing rules governing oligopoly and to the type of product di¤erentiation. 1 We demonstrate that the standard conclusions about price and quantity competition can be altered in the context of a vertically related market. In particular, we show that downstream Cournot competition yields more competitive market outcomes than downstream Bertrand competition-it yields higher output and lower prices. The reversal from the standard results is driven by the fact that the upstream monopolist has stronger incentives to increase the aggressiveness of the downstream …rms when they compete in quantities than when they compete in prices. Because of this, its incentives to behave opportunistically are more pronounced in the former case. The latter leads, in turn, to lower wholesale prices under Cournot competition that translate into lower marginal costs for the downstream …rms, and thus, into higher output and lower prices. Despite the fact that downstream competition is …ercer when it takes place in quantities, still the downstream …rms are better o¤ than than when they compete in prices. This reveals that the e¤ect of the lower input prices, and thus, of the higher e¢ ciency, dominates the e¤ect of the increased competition intensity.
Interestingly, in light of the above results, and in contrast to conventional wisdom, we …nd that Cournot competition is preferable to Bertrand competition from both the consumers' and the total welfare point of view.
Our analysis extends the above-mentioned extensive literature that compares Cournot and Bertrand outcomes in standard one-tier oligopoly markets by considering a vertically related setting. As such our analysis also complements the literature on contracting in vertically 
The Model
An upstream …rm, U , produces, at zero marginal cost, an input which two downstream …rms, D 1 and D 2 , use, in one-to-one-proportion, in the production of their …nal goods. Downstream …rms face no other cost than the cost of obtaining the input from U . 3 Consumers'inverse and direct demands for D i 's …nal good are:
where p i and q i are respectively D i 's price and quantity, and , with 2 (0; 1), is a measure of the substitutability among the products of the downstream …rms. 4 The timing of moves is as follows. First, U bargains with each D i over the terms of a two-part tari¤ contract, i.e., over a wholesale price, w i , and a …xed fee, after observing each other's contract terms. 5 2 An exception is Arya et al. (2008) which similar to us …nd that Cournot competition results into more competitive and e¢ cient outcomes than Bertrand competition. However, the driving forces behind their results, as well as the model that they use are thoroughly di¤erent from ours: they consider a market consisting of a vertically integrated …rm and a non-integrated downstream rival. 3 Assuming zero marginal production costs upstream and downstream is without loss of generality. 4 See Singh and Vives (1984) for details regarding the derivation of the demand functions from the representative consumer's utility maximization problem. 5 According to Rey and Vergé's (2004) terminology, we assume that contracts are interim observable. A we obtain a unique equilibrium by imposing pairwise proofness on the equilibrium contracts,
i.e., we require that a contract between U and D i is immune to a bilateral deviation of U with D j . The following assumption guarantees the existence of a pure strategy pairwise proof equilibrium: 7
For notational reasons, we use superscripts C and B to denote respectively the equilibrium values under Cournot and Bertrand competition in the downstream market.
Equilibrium Analysis
We start by solving the last stage of the game, …rst, under Cournot competition, and then, under Bertrand competition.
(i) Cournot competition: Each D i chooses q i in order to maximize its pro…ts:
The resulting reaction functions are:
Note that a reduction in the wholesale price charged to D i shifts out its reaction function and turns it into a more aggressive downstream competitor.
Solving the system of reaction functions (2), we obtain the quantities in terms of the 
It is straightforward to derive the respective equilibrium downstream and upstream pro…ts:
(ii) Bertrand competition: Each D i chooses p i in order to maximize its pro…ts:
The …rst-order conditions give rise to the following reaction functions:
A reduction in the wholesale price charged to D i shifts in its reaction function and, as in the case of Cournot competition, turns it into a more aggressive competitor. Solving (6), we obtain the equilibrium prices in terms of the wholesale prices:
The resulting equilibrium quantity and pro…ts are:
Next, we determine the equilibrium contract terms -we solve the …rst stage of the game.
In stage one, U bargains with D i over (w i , F i ), taking as given the equilibrium contract terms with
, where M , with M = C; B, denotes the mode of downstream competition. In particular, w i and F i are chosen to solve the following generalized Nash product:
where
U 's pro…ts when its negotiations with D i break down and D j acts as a monopolist in the downstream market facing w M j , i.e., it produces the monopoly quantity, q mon
Maximizing (10) with respect to F i , we obtain:
Substituting (11) into (10), it follows that w i is chosen in order to solve:
It is well-known from the literature on vertical contracting (see e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990, Rey and Vergé, 2004 ) that when an upstream monopolist, which supplies multiple competing downstream …rms, deals with one of its downstream customers, it has incentives to "free-ride" on its other downstream customers. That is, when U negotiates with D i , it has incentives to behave opportunistically and o¤er a lower wholesale price to D i than to D j because by doing so it will a¤ect D j 's response in the market competition stage. In this way, it will raise D i 's market share and gross pro…ts that it will then transfer upstream through a higher …xed fee charged to D i . When the negotiations with the downstream …rms, as in our setting, take place separately, and thus, they are secret, there is no guarantee that U will not behave in such an opportunistic way since U is unable to commit to any of the downstream …rms regarding the terms o¤ered to others. This is re ‡ected in (12) 8 This implies that we have assumed that a breakdown in one pair's negotiations does not trigger new negotiations in the rival pair. We should also stress that our results remain intact, if we assume instead that Dj acts as a duopolist in the downstream market facing w M j (as in Horn and Wolinsky, 1988) . 9 If the negotiations between U and the two downstream …rms, did not take place separately, i.e., if contracts were public and thus, each downstream …rm observed both its own contracts terms and the terms of its rival before deciding to accept them, the maximum overall industry pro…ts would have been induced, because, due to the public commitment, U would not have been able to behave opportunistically.
U 's opportunistic behavior, both under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, would turn down an o¤er that maximizes the industry's overall pro…ts. 10 In particular, solving (12) , …rst under downstream Cournot competition, we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices:
The solution instead of (12) under downstream Bertrand competition results into the following:
Observe that under Cournot competition, the equilibrium wholesale prices (13) Substituting (13) into (3) and (4), we obtain the equilibrium output and price, as well as the equilibrium downstream and upstream pro…ts under Cournot competition:
From (14), (7), (8) and (9), it follows that the respective equilibrium values under 1 0 In order to maximize the overall industry pro…ts, both input prices would have to be set above the upstream marginal cost in order to counteract the negative competitive externality existing whenever there is competition in the downstream market (see McAfee and Schwartz, 1994 ).
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Bertrand competition are given by:
Cournot vs. Bertrand Downstream Competition
We turn now to the comparison of the equilibrium outcomes under Cournot and Bertrand …nal market competition.
Proposition 1
The equilibrium wholesale prices and the …nal prices are higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, while the opposite holds for the equilibrium output.
Proposition 1 informs us that under Cournot competition the downstream …rms obtain the input at better terms than under Bertrand competition. This is a straightforward implication of the fact that, as explained above, the upstream monopolist su¤ers more from the commitment problem when downstream …rms compete in quantities than in prices. Clearly, this …nding implies, in turn, that downstream …rms face a lower marginal cost, and thus, they enjoy higher e¢ ciency under Cournot rather than under Bertrand competition. In light of this, it is not surprising that, as Proposition 1 also informs us, Cournot competition is more competitive than Bertrand competition, or else, that Bertrand competition yields higher prices and lower output than Cournot competition. Since the downstream …rms are less e¢ cient under Bertrand competition, they charge higher prices and they produce a smaller quantity than under Cournot competition.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium downstream pro…ts are higher under Cournot than under
Bertrand competition, while the opposite holds for the equilibrium upstream pro…ts.
Proof. We take the di¤erence C
; and we note that it is always positive. Similarly, we take the di¤erence C In a one-tier market, the explanation for this result is that competition is …ercer under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. This is not the explanation though in a vertically related market since, as we saw in Proposition 1, Cournot is more competitive than Bertrand. In a vertically related market, such as the one considered here, the higher downstream pro…ts under Cournot competition are due, instead, to the higher e¢ ciency of the downstream …rms resulting from the lower wholesale prices due to the more severe upstream monopolist's commitment problem.
According also to Proposition 2, the preferences of the upstream and downstream …rms are not aligned. The upstream …rm, in contrast to the downstream …rms, attains higher pro…ts when downstream competition is in prices rather than in quantities. This is so because, as explained above, under price competition U su¤ers less from the commitment problem.
Next, we examine whether Bertrand or Cournot competition is preferable from both the consumers'welfare and the total welfare viewpoints.
Proposition 3 Consumers' surplus as well as total welfare are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition.
Proof. Consumers'surplus is given by
After substituting (15) , (16) , (17) , and (18), total welfare under Cournot and Bertrand competition is given respectively by T W C = a 2 (2 )(6 3 2 ) 4(2 2 ) 2 and T W B = a 2 (2+ ) (6 ) 16(1+ )
. Taking the
; we note that it is always positive. Thus,
In contrast to conventional wisdom, we …nd that a market with Cournot competition is more e¢ cient than a market with Bertrand competition, in the sense that both the consumers' surplus and the total welfare are higher in the former case. For consumers'surplus this is a straightforward implication of the fact that in a Cournot market prices are lower and output is higher than in a Bertrand market (Proposition 1). The higher total welfare under Cournot competition arises because, in contrast to the upstream pro…ts, both the consumers'surplus and the downstream pro…ts are higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. In other words, in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading with nonlinear contracts, Cournot competition is more socially desirable than Bertrand competition.
Conclusion
We have shown that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and
Bertrand competition can be reversed in a vertically related market with trading through non-linear contracts. In such a market, the incentives of an upstream monopolist to make its customers more aggressive in the downstream market are stronger when the latter compete 8 in quantities than when they compete in prices. As a result, the upstream monopolist faces a more severe commitment problem under Cournot than under Bertrand downstream competition and charges lower wholesale prices in the former case. The lower wholesale prices translate into higher e¢ ciency for the downstream …rms and, in turn, into lower …nal prices and higher output and consumers' surplus in the case of Cournot competition. Although under Cournot competition the upstream pro…ts are lower than under Bertrand competition, the downstream pro…ts along with the total welfare are higher.
We should stress, however, that our results are not necessarily robust to alternative assumptions regarding the upstream market structure and/or the contracting procedure (e.g., contract type, observability of contract terms). This suggests that the well-known results regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition can depend crucially not only on whether or not the markets are vertically related, but also on the speci…c features of the vertically related markets.
